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By preventing voters who have a collective interest from combining
their votes, the structural characteristics of the electoral process can
deny them the opportunity for effective political representation.' The
Supreme Court has recognized this problem, 2 but it has never fully
identified the extent to which the Constitution provides a solution.
In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,3 the Court missed an op-
portunity to define more precisely both the nature of voting rights
in general and the state's obligation to prevent debasement of poten-
tial political representation in particular. The Court upheld a form
of special treatment for minorities-racially conscious redistricting by
the state of New York designed to enhance the ability of nonwhites
to elect representatives of their choice. Although nearly unanimous in
its judgment, 4 the Court was sharply divided over the justification
for such a departure from the ideal of equal treatment. By referring
several times to the interests of blocs of white and nonwhite voters,
however, the plurality implied that racial groups might be able to as-
sert some form of group voting rights.5
1. John Stuart Mill recognized the problem faced by minority groups in a representa-
tive system:
In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not dispro-
portionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a
majority of the representatives, but a minority of the electors would always have a
minority of the representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully represented as
the majority. Unless they are, there is not equal government, but a government of
inequality and privilege: one part of the people rule over the rest: there is a part
whose fair and equal share of influence in the representation is withheld from
them, contrary to all just government, but, above all, contrary to the principle of
democracy, which professes equality as its very root and foundation.
J.S. MILL, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 146 (New York 1862).
2. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 532-33 (1973) (state actions with potential
of diluting minority voting power subject to Voting Rights Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. § 1973
(1970)); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 388 (1971) (dilution of minority voting
strength by annexation); Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 569 (1969) (minority
voting power "nullified" by at-large voting). See generally Note, Ghetto Voting and At-
Large Elections: A Subtle Infringement Upon Minority Rights, 58 GEo. L.J. 989 (1970).
3. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
4. Of the participating Justices, only Chief Justice Burger dissented. Justice Marshall
took no part in the consideration or decision of the case. 430 U.S. at 146.
5. 430 U.S. at 160-61 (plurality opinion of White, J.) (state may create black majorities
to comply with statutory mandate); id. at 166-68 (state may act to alleviate effects of
racial bloc voting); id. at 167 (state may not invidiously minimize voting strength of racial
or political groups).
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This Note argues that the Court should have expanded on these
tentative suggestions in United Jewish Organizations by recognizing
an aggregate right to potential proportional representation for racial
groups. Such a holding would have buttressed the Court's reasoning
by linking United Jewish Organizations with the Fifteenth Amend-
ment's proscription against abridging the right to vote on account of
race. Recognition of an aggregate right, moreover, would not compel
the Court to endorse racially conscious state action or group rights
in contexts that may not share the peculiar characteristics of voting.
Nor would enforcement of such a right place onerous administrative
burdens on the states or require courts to make political decisions.
I. The Court's Overtures to Group Voting Interests
Without finding that the right to vote is a necessary incident of
national citizenship," courts have nevertheless held consistently that
once the entitlement to vote has been extended, it may not be denied
in a discriminatory manner. 7 Under both the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments, this right to vote was traditionally defined in
individual terms as the ability to register, cast a ballot, and have one's
vote counted.8 But this narrow definition of the right to vote proved
inadequate to protect even rudimentary privileges of equal repre-
6. See, e.g., United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217 (1875) (voiding statute unauthorized
by Fifteenth Amendment, which "does not confer the right to vote upon anyone"); Minor
v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171 (1874) (rejecting claim for women's suffrage and
noting that "the Constitution has not added the right of suffrage to the privileges and
immunities of citizenship").
7. The right to vote, once extended, has been treated as a fundamental liberty, Harper
v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966) (poll tax discriminates on basis of
wealth), and every citizen's vote must be equally weighted, Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533, 562-63 (1964) (one man, one vote). Cf. Note, supra note 2, at 1002-03 (challenging
at-large electoral systems as discriminating against racial minorities). Under the equal
protection clause the right to vote has been protected against discrimination based on a
wide variety of criteria. See Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51 (1973) (prior party affilia-
tion); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (property ownership); Moore v.
Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (place of residence); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663 (1966) (wealth). But cf. Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (party enroll-
ment 30 days prior to general election upheld as prerequisite to vote in following
primary).
Similarly, the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as well as the Fifteenth Amendment protects
the individual right to vote against denial or abridgment on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat.
437 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 1973bb4 (Supp. V 1975)). The courts have used
this authority to invalidate a number of discriminatory devices. See, e.g., Gaston County
v. United States, 395 U.S. 285 (1969) (literacy test); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339
(1960) (gerrymandering); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (white primary); Guinn
v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (grandfather clause).
8. See Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 380 (1963) (citing authorities).
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sentation in a democratic system.9 As the courts sought to remedy per-
sistent problems, they found themselves impelled to protect group
aspects of voting as well. 10
The Supreme Court dramatically expanded the notion of voting
rights in Reynolds v. Sims". by deriving the "one man, one vote" doc-
trine from the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court held that state
legislative districts must be substantially equal in population, because
anyone living in a relatively overpopulated district suffers "dilution"
of his vote.'2 But the Court failed to make clear whether the type of
voting right entitled to protection under the one man, one vote prin-
ciple was an individual right to affect the outcome of elections and
influence legislators13 or a group right to equal representation. 14 Most
cases after Reynolds v. Sims have treated the "dilution" problem as
exclusively affecting individual voting rights15 and even under this
limited view courts have declined to accept the full implications of
the "full and effective participation"' 6 standard.' 7
9. See Note, Racial Gerrymandering, 51 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 584, 584-86 (1974) (districting
can leave minority groups unrepresented); 60 MARQ. L. REV. 173, 178 (1976) (even
mathematically equal vote fails to ensure fair representation).
10. See, e.g., United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 167 (1977) (state may
not invidiously minimize voting strength of racial or political groups); White v. Regester,
412 U.S. 755, 766 (1973) (constitutional violation if political process not equally open to
all groups).
11. 377 U.S. 533 (1964). Reynolds held that where legislative districts are not sub-
stantially equal in population, voters are denied equal protection of the laws. Id. at
568. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1964), had previously held that U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 2 requires that congressional districts be equal in population. The Court had
already held that the problem of equality of representation was a justiciable issue and
not a political question. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
12.' 377 U.S. at 555.
13. The Court relied on precedent treating voting rights primarily as individual. See
377 U.S. at 754-55 (citing cases). In individual terms, a voter in a disproportionately large
district theoretically has less of a chance to affect the outcome of a vote or to exert
influence on the legislator after election than does his counterpart in a smaller district.
14. By requiring population equality among voting districts, Reynolds v. Sims facilitated
equalization of group interests in voting, even though these interests were defined by
geography rather than race. Specifically, the apportionment scheme struck down in Rey-
nolds as a violation of equal protection systematically favored rural groups over the more
rapidly expanding urban interests. Id. at 543, 567 nA3, 580; cf. 43 TEx. L. REv. 236, 238
(1964) (Reynolds interpreted as holding that states may not use balancing between rural
and urban interests as excuse for unequal districts).
15. See, e.g., Obermiller v.. Siegel, 340 F. Supp. 208, 210 (D. Neb. 1972) (population, not
likeness of interest, touchstone of Reynolds); Bannister v. Davis, 263 F. Supp. 202, 206
(E.D. La. 1966) (three-judge court) ("individual vote is key"). Cf. Casper, Apportionment
and the Right to Vote: Standards of Judicial Scrutiny, 1973 Sup. CT. REv. 1, 2 (reapportion-
ment cases focus on individual rights).
16. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 565 (1964).
17. In Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124 (1971), the plaintiffs argued in part that the
individual right to vote is diluted in any system that includes districts of varying sizes,
even when some districts are represented by several legislators to take account of their
relatively large size. They reasoned that voters in the larger, multimember districts have
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Even if the Court had endorsed a principle of absolute theoretical
equality among individual voters, equal representation would not be
guaranteed, since manipulations of the electoral process such as gerry-
mandering can minimize the political power of a group and can un-
dercut the one man, one vote standard. 8 If, for example, district
boundaries are drawn so that nonwhite voters are scattered among
many districts but do not constitute a majority in any, the special in-
terests' 9 of these voters may be denied representation.2 0 Having the
same theoretical chance of affecting the outcome of an election as
other voters in districts of equal size is of little consequence if racial
bloc voting ensures that a nonwhite minority will never, in fact, in-
fluence any election.
2 1
In White v. Regester22 the Court, responding to this tension between
individual and group interests in voting, took a tentative step toward
a constitutional mandate for group representation. The Court found
that an apportionment system including multimember districts im-
paired the potential for effective representation of black and His-
panic voters. These minorities could probably have elected their fa-
vored candidates by bloc voting under a system of single-member dis-
tricts, but they were foreclosed from representation by inclusion in
multimember districts with white majorities. This districting system,
together with certain balloting rules and a past history of discrimi-
a greater probability of casting a deciding vote in any given election than do voters in
smaller multimember or single-member districts. Id. at 144-45. See Banzhaf, Multi-
Member Electoral Districts-Do They Violate the "One Man, One Vote" Principle, 75
YALE L.J. 1309, 1323-24 (1966) (suggesting that equality among individual voters man-
dates that each have equal probability of affecting electoral outcome, which requires that
all districts be equal in population). The Court rejected such an unqualified standard of
individual effectiveness and stated that the plaintiffs had not demonstrated any actual
impact on political participation. 403 U.S. at 145-46. The factors cited by the Court as
affecting actual voting power were party affiliation, race, and previous voting characteris-
tics. Id. at 146. The Court thus implied that these factors influence individual effective-
ness by dictating whether the groups to which an individual belongs are able to secure
representation.
18. See, e.g., R. DIXON, DEmOCRATicc REPRESENTATION 18 (1968) ("Whether by chance or
by design, the possibility arises that an existing apportionment plan, however equal on
a purely mathematical basis, will nevertheless overrepresent or underrepresent identifiable
groups of voters.")
19. See p. 589 & note 102 infra (special interests of racial groups derive from his-
tory of discrimination and are illustrated by bloc voting patterns of these groups).
20. See, e.g., R. DixoN, supra note 18, at 466 (gerrymandered equality can make
mockery of "one man, one vote"); Note, supra note 9, at 584 (districting can leave
minority viewpoint unrepresented).
21. Scholars have repeatedly argued that representation consists of more than in-
dividuals each casting a single ballot. See, e.g., Banzhaf, supra note 17, at 1310-11
(existence of ethnic blocs affects ability to pick representatives); Casper, Social Differences
and the Franchise, 104 DAEDALUS 103, 105 (1976) (voting only instrumental to goal of
representation).
22. 412 U.S. 755 (1973).
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nation, ensured election of only white representatives. 23 The Court
found that these factors combined to deny representation to minority
groups. 24 The decision thus suggested that effective participation
might entail at least some assurance of potential representation for
group interests.
25
The suggestion has never ripened into doctrine.26 Although con-
tinuing to refer in general terms to "effective representation," the
Court has found a violation of equal protection only where a class
of voters has carried the extraordinary burden of showing that it will
be totally excluded from representation. 27 This hesitance to act on
the broad implications of Regester results from a concern that the
concept of group political representation may not be easy to limit-
that the clamor of multitudinous racial, religious, ethnic, and po-
23. The Court in Regester pointed to the discriminatory effects of "place rules" and
the requirement of a majority vote as a prerequisite to nomination. Id. at 766. Place
rules pair-off candidates on the ballot so that they must engage in head-to-head con-
tests. Id. at 766. Under alternative rules the candidates with the highest overall vote
totals would fill the available seats. In the latter scheme, minorities have a chance of
electing representatives if the majority splits its votes among many candidates, but the
place rules ensure that minorities will be less able to take advantage of dissension within
the majority during the first round of primaries.
Although the Court alluded to the history of discrimination as a factor in its decision,
id. at 766, it did not clarify the relation between past constitutional violations and the
fairness of the present political system. The Court may have been considering the prac-
tical effects of past discrimination in discouraging racial minorities from participation
and the likelihood that informal barriers to political activity would remain. In order to
ensure that minority participation would be facilitated, it was not enough to remove
official discrimination while forcing nonwhites to seek a voice in predominantly white
districts.
24. Id. at 765.
25. Id. at 765-66 (political processes "not equally open to participation" may in-
vidiously cancel out or minimize voting strength of racial groups). At least one case prior
to Regester had treated the right to vote in terms of the effectiveness of group expression.
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968) (excessive petition requirement for placing minor
party on ballot upset). Nevertheless, it was far from clear that Regester signaled a com-
plete endorsement of a group effectiveness principle. See Casper, supra note 21, at 111
(case simply "a temporary 'corrective action,' a slight departure from the ordinary denial
of a right to representation to specific segments of the population").
26. The retrenchment after Regester has been evident in the leeway that the Court
has given states to consider political factors in designing electoral systems. For example,
states are permitted to consider political party affiliation in apportionment, Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973), and to impose obstacles to the placement of independent
candidates on the ballot, Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).
27. See, e.g., Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S. 1, 17 (1975) (disproportionate actual rep-
resentation insufficient without proof that minorities are denied access "equal to the
access of other groups"). Lower courts have followed the Supreme Court's lead. See, e.g.,
Ferguson v. Winn Parish Police Jury, 528 F.2d 592, 597-98 (5th Cir. 1976) ("bizarre"
plan upheld in absence of showing of invidious discrimination); Kendrick v. Walder, 527
F.2d 44, 48 (7th Cir. 1975) (minority voters required to demonstrate actual impact of
electoral system). Cf. Comment, Political Gerrymandering: A Statutory Compactness
Standard as an Antidote for Judicial Impotence, 41 U. Cm. L. REv. 398, 406-09 (1974)
(plaintiffs required to show actual denial of effective representation).
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litical groups for effective representation might draw the courts into
a futile effort to restructure state political systems to maximize the
political potential of all groups simultaneously.
28
The courts have failed to recognize that the Fifteenth Amendment
provides an alternative basis for a principle of political effectiveness
that preserves voting rights where they are most fragile without threat-
ening traditional representation systems. By its terms, the Fifteenth
Amendment prohibits the denial or abridgment of voting rights on
account of race.2 9 Thus if courts apply the Fifteenth Amendment
rather than the equal protection clause where racial groups are in-
volved, they will avoid an uncontrolled expansion of the effectiveness
principle to countless interest groups. Because of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment's strict command to protect voting interests from abridgment
and its applicability only to racial classifications, groups seeking its
protection should not be saddled with the inflexible requirement of
showing total exclusion from the political process. Rather, they should
be able to assert an aggregate right to political processes that provide,
to the greatest extent possible, for potential proportional representa-
tion of racial groups.
II. United Jewish Organizations: An Opportunity Missed
In United Jewish Organizations v. Carey,30 the Supreme Court ne-
glected a chance to recognize the existence of an aggregate right and
thus failed to resolve the uncertainties that persisted after Regester.
Certain counties in the state of New York were required by section 5
of the Voting Rights Act of 196531 to submit to the United States At-
torney General any reapportionment plans.32 The Justice Department
had rejected a 1972 plan because New York had failed to prove that
the apportionment would not have the effect of abridging the right
to vote on account of race, in view of past use of a literacy test.33 A
revised plan issued in 1974 received Justice Department approval be-
cause it enlarged black population majorities in certain districts to
28. See note 94 infra.
29. "The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition
of servitude." U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
30. 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
31. Any state or political subdivision that had utilized a "test or device" for screening
potential voters and that had a turnout of less than 50% of "persons of voting age" in
the 1968 Presidential election was subject to the provisions of the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)
(1970).
32. 430 U.S. at 148-49.
33. Id. at 150.
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sixty-five percent to reflect the overall population ratio.34 The revised
plan split the Williamsburgh district containing a community of Ha-
sidic Jews among several state senate and assembly districts. Under
both the 1972 plan and previous apportionments, this community had
been contained in a single senate and assembly district.3 5 The Hasidim
charged that the new plan's dilution of the value of their vote con-
travened their Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights as white
voters.3 6
The Court upheld the constitutionality of the plan, but the Justices
divided in their reasoning.3 7 Justice White's plurality opinion treated
the use of racial criteria as the threshold constitutional issue and sus-
tained the state's use of racial considerations as in compliance with
section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.38 Apart from his reliance
on the statute, Justice White argued that the state's attempt in redis-
tricting was necessary to achieve a fair allocation of political power
among racial groups.30 Both of the plurality's rationales provide in-
direct support for recognizing an aggregate voting right: the statutory
reasoning is insufficient without it, and the constitutional approach
alludes to group interests in voting though it does not appreciate their
full constitutional significance.
A. The Statutory Argument
1. Reasoning of the Plurality in United Jewish Organizations
The plurality opinion relied heavily on section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965,40 which applies to states and their subdivisions that
have in the recent past utilized literacy tests and experienced low elec-
34. Id. at 152.
35. 430 U.S. at 152; Brief for Petitioners at 6, id.
36. 430 U.S. at 152-53. In dismissing the complaint, the court below held that the
plaintiffs had no equal protection claim as representatives of the Hasidic community.
United Jewish Organizations v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 520-21 (2d Cir. 1975), afj'd sub nom.
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). This holding was not chal-
lenged on review, and before the Supreme Court the plaintiffs alleged deprivation of
their rights only as white voters. Brief for Petitioners at 2, 18-19, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
37. Justice White wrote the plurality opinion. Justice Stevens concurred in this
opinion in its entirety, while Justices Brennan. Blackmun, and Rehnquist concurred in
part. Justice Brennan also wrote a separate opinion in which he emphasized the relation
between the state's action and the Voting Rights Act. 430 U.S. at 168-69. Justice Stewart,
joined by Justice Powell, wrote a separate opinion concurring in the judgment but relying
on the plaintiffs' failure to show either that the votes of whites had been undervalued
or that the requisite invidious discriminatory purpose was present. Id. at 179-80.
38. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (Supp. V 1975); 430 U.S. at 161.
39. 430 U.S. at 165.
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (Supp. V 1975).
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toral participation. 41 Section 5 requires these jurisdictions to show that
any proposed modifications in electoral procedures do not have the
purpose or effect of denying the right to vote on account of race.42
Modifications not meeting this test may not be implemented. The
constitutionality of this extraordinary mechanism has been upheld as
a proper response to pervasive patterns of discrimination. 43 The mech-
anism operates both to remedy past discrimination and to prevent fu-
ture violations of voting rights. 4
4
In applying the Voting Rights Act in United Jewish Organizations,
the plurality made three critical steps in its analysis. First, it reasoned
that the use of racial criteria may be permissible in designing a remedy
for a statutory violation.4 5 This step is well supported both by the
Voting Rights Act cases cited in the opinion 4 and by precedent de-
veloped outside the context of voting rights.47 Second, the plurality
noted that the Justice Department had approved the 1974 plan.48 It
argued that this approval created a presumption that the plan com-
plied with the Act and specifically with the nonretrogression principle
of Beer v. United States,49 which prohibits a reapportionment plan
from reducing minority representation. 0 This presumption may be
appropriate when determining whether a plan is retrogressive, since
the Attorney General is specifically charged with the duty of protecting
minority interests from being disadvantaged.51 But the Attorney Gen-
eral's role as advocate does not ensure equal zeal in protecting the
interests of whites, the allegedly disadvantaged group in this case. The
presumption of legitimacy was accordingly unjustified.
The third step in the plurality's reasoning was that the plaintiffs
failed to overcome the presumption of compliance with the Act be-
cause they introduced no evidence that the action taken by the state
41. Id. § 1973b(b).
42. Id. § 1973c.
43. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328-29 (1966).
44. Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965).
45. Id. at 161.
46. The Court relied in particular on Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141-42
(1976) (redistricting using racial criteria approved when minority voting power not re-
duced), and City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 370-71 (1975) (racially
conscious districting approved as means of preventing annexation from abridging minority
voting rights).
47. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (remedies
designed to eliminate vestiges of state-imposed school segregation upheld).
48. 430 U.S. at 153.
49. 425 U.S. 130 (1976).
50. 430 U.S. at 164.
51. Cf. United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 175 (1977) (Brennan, J.,
concurring in part) (voting Rights Act makes Attorney General "champion of the interests
of minority voters").
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of New York in creating nonwhite majority districts went beyond the
requirements of the Act.52 The plurality thus concluded that the de-
liberate creation of nonwhite majority districts in Williamsburgh
should be upheld,5 3 and it accepted the specific sixty-five percent
guideline used to obtain viable nonwhite majorities.54 This reasoning
is problematic. By stressing the plaintiffs' failure to show that the 1974
plan enhanced nonwhite voting power 55 and by assuming that the At-
torney General's approval indicated that the plan did not disadvantage
nonwhites,5 6 the plurality adopted the improbable assumption that
the 1974 plan in fact exactly restored the allocation of political power
among racial groups to 1966 levels. 57 It is more likely either that non-
white majorities exceeded 1966 levels, consistent with the plaintiffs'
claim of being disadvantaged, or that nonwhite voting power was re-
duced, contrary to the presumption that the 1974 plan complied with
the nonretrogression principle. Even if this assumption of exact repli-
cation of the prior political balance was warranted in the absence of
contrary evidence, the Court was harsh to affirm dismissal of the com-
plaint58 when it might have remanded for evidence on this point. 59
52. Id. at 162-63.
53. Id. at 162.
54. Id. at 162-64. The plurality found the 65% figure a reasonable estimate of the
nonwhite population majority needed to achieve a nonwhite majority of eligible voters.
Id. at 164.
55. Id. at 163.
56. Id. at 164 (Attorney Generals approval authorized by § 5).
57. In redistricting, New York was influenced by the need to meet one man, one
vote requirements, the constraints of the Voting Rights Act, and, of course, political con-
siderations. It strains credibility to assume that eight years after the original appor-
tionment, with demographic patterns constantly changing, the state was able to develop
a plan that preserved nonwhite majorities exactly as they had been in 1966 and also
achieved almost exact population equality. Brief for the United States at 54 (statistical
appendix).
58. The failure of the plaintiffs to carry a burden of proof would be fatal in most
situations. Here, however, the plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case showing vio-
lation of Fourteenth Amendment rights. The defendants raised the issue of compliance
with the Voting Rights Act as an affirmative defense. Brief for State Respondents at 16.
It seems incorrect to reject the plaintiffs' claim for failure to demonstrate that the de-
fense was unavailable. See United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 183-84
(1977) (Burger, CJ., dissenting) (lack of evidence on compliance with nonretrogression
principle makes remand appropriate). Compare McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971)
(affirmative duty to desegregate schools held full defense for racially conscious plan) with
Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 732-33 (Ist Cir. 1972) (in equal protection cases involving
racial classifications, state bears burden of justification). Although the Court seemed to
accept the Attorney General's approval as a prima facie defense, this deference to the
Department of Justice was unwarranted. See p. 578 & note 51 supra.
59. See Security Investor Protection v. Morgan, Kennedy & Co., 533 F.2d 1314, 1322
(2d Cir. 1976) (where need for factfinding, caution dictates remand). Cf. Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475 n.6 (1970) (remand when court below expresses no view on
controlling issue).
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2. Application of a Least Drastic Means Test in
United Jewish Organizations
The remedies allowed states under the Voting Rights Act must
be limited to prevent states from engaging in invidious discrimination
by exceeding the legislatively required use of racial classifications.
Justice White's plurality opinion in United Jewish Organizations at-
tempted to resolve the conflict between the statutory remedy and the
constitutional proscription against racial classifications60 by assuming
that New York's use of racial criteria was presumptively valid. Once
it has been shown that the plurality's assumption of validity was un-
warranted, an alternative means of reconciling statutory and constitu-
tional requirements must be found that can justify the decision in
United Jewish Organizations. Without recognizing an aggregate right
to vote, the Court could only have upheld a statutory remedy that
was the least drastic means for correcting violations of voting rights,61
and the redistricting in United Jewish Organizations failed to meet
such a test.
To guard against overstepping the constitutional boundary, two re-
quirements should be met before a remedial action made pursuant to
the Voting Rights Act can be upheld. Since the state's action can be
justified only in terms of its corrective or preventive effect, the ju-
diciary first should disregard state concerns unrelated to past or po-
tential statutory violations. 62 In United Jewish Organizations, New
York met this subject matter limitation because it offered no justi-
fication for its redistricting beyond those relating to protection of
minority voting interests.
The Court also should impose a more specific nexus requirement
that obligates the state to show that its corrective action is necessary
60. The Court has always used special care in scrutinizing classifications based solely
on race because such distinctions contravene both the doctrine of equality, Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (wartime curfews upheld despite racial criteria
only because of extraordinary circumstances), and American social traditions, Bolling v.
Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954) (racially segregated schools contrary to tradition of equal
treatment), and conflict with the central purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment, Hunter
v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 395 (1969) (referendum requirement for fair housing legislation
disadvantages minorities); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (interracial
cohabitation). In most circumstances racial criteria are irrelevant to any permissible legis-
lative purpose, id. at 192; Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943).
61. In the context of voting rights, the Supreme Court previously overturned a court-
imposed remedy in part because less drastic correctives might have been available.
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 160-61 (1971) (lower court exceeded authority in
disestablishing multimember district system).
62. For example, the state could not assert as a justification the benefits racial redis-
tricting might have in protecting the seats of incumbent legislators.
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to meet the requirements of the Act.63 This nexus limitation should
be a constitutional necessity because of the potential impact of racial
classifications on vital interests in voting. 64 As the Court acknowl-
edged in United Jewish Organizations, redistricting affects the ability
of groups to have a voice in governance. 65 Unless a state were obli-
gated to show that its action is the least drastic means for remedying
or preventing violations of the Act, it would have a free hand to re-
allocate political power to the disadvantage of racial groups, a power
contrary to the spirit of the equal protection clause.6 6 The Voting
Rights Act does not provide such open-ended authority.
67
63. In contexts other than voting, courts have allowed remedies based on explicit
racial classifications where there has been a finding that past discrimination imposes a
duty on the state for complete eradication of a wrong, but where the violation has
been fully eliminated additional race-conscious state action cannot be required. Compare
Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 774 (1976) (plan disadvantaging whites neces-
sary to remedy specific, individual violations of employment rights of minorities) and
McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39, 41 (1971) (upholding race-conscious desegregation plan
designed by school board) with Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 435-36
(1976) (district court exceeded authority by enforcing desegregation order after constitu-
tional violation fully remedied) and Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744-45 (1974) (multi-
district remedy inappropriate where constitutional violation occurred in single school
district).
64. The Supreme Court's failure to date to recognize the constitutional necessity for
a nexus limitation for remedies under the Voting Rights Act can be attributed to the
dearth of cases in which it has considered the substantive requirements of § 5. The Court
acknowledged in Beer v. United States that it was considering for the first time the
criteria that a legislative reapportionment would have to meet under § 5. 425 U.S.
130, 139 n.11 (1976). It had previously held, consistent with the nexus limitation, that
a ward system fairly reflecting potential nonwhite voting strength would be permissible as
necessary to prevent a municipal annexation from undervaluing minority political power
in the enlarged city. City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358, 371 (1975).
65. 430 U.S. at 162 (plurality opinion of White, J.) (bolstering black majority necessary
means for ensuring opportunity to elect black representatives).
66. See note 84 infra (discussing extraordinary justification required to uphold
racial classification).
67. The Act does provide for extraordinary remedies. The Court has upheld the
constitutionality of suspending existing literacy tests and reviewing proposed changes in
the electoral processes of covered states before they become effective. South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324, 333-35 (1966) ("As against the reserved powers of the
States, Congress may use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional prohibition
of racial discrimination in voting.") It has also been held that the Act's purpose is to
"eliminate the discriminatory effects of the past as well as bar like discrimination in
the future." Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 154 (1965). This mandate has been
relied upon to justify the .establishment of racial quotas. See Comment, Reverse Dis-
crimination: The Balancing of Human Rights, 12 WAKE FOREsT L. REV. 852, 862 (1976).
The Court's approval of the exceptional remedies provided in the Voting Rights Act
was based, however, on extensive legislative factfinding that bears little relation to the
circumstances in United Jewish Organizations. See Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 132-33
(1970) (opinion of Black, J.) (literacy tests used extensively to disenfranchise nonwhites);
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 313-15 (review mechanism was justified by wide-
spread evasion of court orders). These findings provide no justification for the redistricting
in United Jewish Organizations, since Congress made no findings that districting had
been so widely used as a discriminatory device that compensatory racial redistricting
The Yale Law Journal
Three types of relationships between a remedy and a violation of
voting rights can occur. As the link between the state's action and
the statutory purpose weakens, use of a racial classification begins to
take on a "suspect" character. 68 First, the most direct relationship
occurs when the state's remedy corrects the violation that triggered
application of section 5. Such an immediate nexus to protection of
a constitutional right ensures validity. The districting plan in United
Jewish Organizations was not a remedy" of this type since the plan
was not necessary for correction of New York's triggering violations-
use of a literacy test and failure to print ballots in Spanish for the
benefit of Hispanic voters.0 9 The individual rights of access to the
ballot box violated by these devices had been secured by eliminating
the literacy test and printing the required ballots, leaving no further
impediments to voter registration."
Second, the remedy may be unrelated to the initial violation but
necessary to prevent additional changes in the electoral system from
abridging voting rights. Such state action falls clearly within the am-
bit of the Act's purpose, but its link to specific constitutional or statu-
tory protections may be problematic. Remedies of this sort have none-
theless been upheld on a number of occasions.71 To find that the
would be warranted. Hence, the Court's heavy reliance in United Jewish Organizations
on its prior decisions was inappropriate.
The Act, moreover, can not empower the Attorney General to command the states to
undertake a course that Congress itself could not force upon them. The Voting Rights
Act is narrowly circumscribed by constitutional limits on federal intervention in state
electoral affairs. The Constitution grants to the states the power to set voter qualifica-
tions, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, c. I, and Congress's ability to legislate in this realm is
confined to enforcement of Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendment rights. See Oregon
v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 125-26 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.) (state power to set voter
qualifications limited only by specific constitutional amendments); id. at 122 (no quali-
fication more important to Framers than geographical qualification embodied in dis-
tricting).
68. Cf. McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (racial classification not
sufficiently related to legitimate state purpose to validate law against interracial co-
habitation); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 100 (1943) (racial discriminations
that are "irrelevant" are prohibited) (dictum).
69. 430 U.S. at 148; id. at 184 n.2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
70. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa (Supp. V 1975) (suspending all literacy tests); Torres v. Sachs,
381 F. Supp. 309, 313 (S.D.N.Y. 1974) (court order to provide ballots in Spanish).
Redistricting, moreover, does not affect the right to register, but reallocates political
power among voters who are already registered. Hispanics, who were largely responsible
for triggering coverage of the Act because of the failure to print ballots in Spanish,
were not aided by the 1974 plan. See 430 U.S. at 184 n.2 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Cf.
Torres v. Sachs, 381 F. Supp. 309 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
71. See City of Richmond v. United States, 422 U.S. 358 (1975); City of Petersburg v.
United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021 (D.D.C. 1972) (three-judge court), aff'd mem., 410 U.S.
962 (1973). In both cases the annexation of largely white areas by these cities threatened
to result in the submergence of the black majority of the old city in a political structure
wholly controlled by the white majority of the enlarged city through an at-large voting
system. In order to preclude such an effect, the municipalities were obligated to engage
in districting that would not undervalue nonwhite political power in the expanded cities.
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state's action in United Jewish Organizations was of this type would
have required the Court to hold that reallocation of voting power in
favor of nonwhites was necessary to prevent future abridgment. Un-
fortunately, the Court sidestepped this issue and merely noted the
lack of proof that New York did more than the Attorney General
could require it to do.72 This assertion fails to allay the suspicion
that New York's redistricting plan was a remedy of a third type-
unrelated to the triggering violation and only tenuously related to
obtaining the Attorney General's approval of the proposed changes-
and would be unnecessary to prevent the abridgment of voting rights.
Actions of this third type are constitutionally suspect and their en-
dorsement by the Court would indicate a general willingness to accept
racially conscious redistricting.73
This ambiguity in the plurality's statutory argument-the failure
to decide whether the remedy was of the second or third type-sug-
gests lingering uncertainty concerning the full reach of the Voting
Rights Act. Without explicitly saying so, the Justices implied that
affirmative enhancement of a traditionally underrepresented minority's
voting power comes within the spirit of the Act and thus the ambit
of the Fifteenth Amendment. 74 But the form of analysis used to reach
this result, through its failure to scrutinize carefully the relation be-
tween statute and remedy, carries the danger of conferring on states
a broader discretion in the use of racial criteria than equal protection
permits. This danger could have been eliminated had the Court for-
mally recognized an aggregate voting right.
72. 430 U.S. at 162-63.
73. The plurality was unclear as to the limits it would place on a state's use of race
in redistricting. The most reasonable reading of the plurality opinion is that enhancement
of a minority's voting power is compelling and permissible so long as uo other disad-
vantaged groups lose political power as a result. The problem then becomes one of de-
termining which groups have been previously disadvantaged and can consequently object
to changes that affect them adversely. In United Jewish Organizations, the interests of
Jewish voters were considered insufficient to afford them a constitutional claim. 430
U.S. at 153. Had the state designed the 1974 plan to enhance the voting power of Jews,
disadvantaged nonwhite voters could have challenged it, but it is an open question
whether objections could have been raised by Italians, Irish, or other identifiable groups
in Brooklyn.
74. In upholding the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act, the Supreme Court
found that the statute was promulgated to satisfy the command of the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966). Later, the Court upheld
one section of the Act as an enactment enforcing Fourteenth Amendment equal pro-
tection. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652-53 (1966) (upholding elimination of
English literacy tests for Spanish-speaking residents educated in American-flag schools).
Finally, the Court split over the basis for upholding a suspension of all literacy tests.
Some Justices relied on the Fourteenth Amendment, Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112,
118 (1970) (opinion of Black, J.) (also adopted Fifteenth Amendment rationale); id. at
144-45 (opinion of Douglas, J.), while others based their conclusion exclusively on the
Fifteenth Amendment, id. at 216 (opinion of Harlan, J.); id. at 235-36 (opinion of Brennan,
J.); id. at 282 (opinion of Stewart, J.).
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B. The Court's Constitutional Analysis
The subsequent section of the plurality opinion put aside the statu-
tory justification and held that even without the Act's authorization
the redistricting did not contravene the Constitution. The reasoning
supporting this conclusion is ambiguous, but two theories are discern-
ible: either the plan did not abridge the rights of white voters78 or
the state had a compelling interest in distributing political power pro-
portionately among racial groups.76
In supporting its finding that the redistricting did not violate the
rights of white voters, the plurality vacillated between two conceptions
of voting. First, the opinion emphasized that individual rights of
whites had not been affected by the reapportionment: they did not
suffer a racial slur nor were they "fenced out" of the political system.
77
Such observations fail to support the result in United Jewish Organi-
zations, however, because reallocation of political power among groups
by changes in the electoral system can violate voting rights even when
individuals are not barred from participating in the resulting system.
7
3
Since New York's use of race as a criterion in redistricting unques-
tionably made it easier for nonwhites and correspondingly more diffi-
cult for whites to elect representatives, the plaintiffs' complaint made
a prima facie showing of a state-imposed disability based on race that
should have been sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss.79
Second, the plurality reasoned that white voters had no constitu-
tional complaint because they had more than a proportional share
of seats in the state legislature.80 This rationale, by focusing on rela-
75. 430 U.S. at 166 ("whites would not be underrepresented relative to their share
of the population") (plurality opinion); id. at 179-80 (record could "not support a find-
ing that the redistricting plan unidervalued the political power of white voters relative to
their numbers in Kings County") (Stewart, J., concurring).
76. 430 U.S. at 167 (plurality opinion of White, J.) (characterizing state as seeking
to "achieve a fair allocation of political power").
77. 430 U.S. at 165. Had the United Jewish Organizations opinion focused exclusively
on individual aspects of voting, the absence of a "fencing out" of white voters would
have been sufficient justification for affirming dismissal of the complaint. However, the
plurality acknowledged its concern with group aspects of voting by reference to mini-
mization of voting strength and fair representation for racial groups. 430 U.S. at 167-68.
78. See note 71 supra (citing cases).
79. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967) (racial classification inherent in ban
on interracial marriage not only raises equal protection cause of action but also triggers
strict scrutiny); United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836, 876 (5th
Cir. 1966), modified en banc, 380 F.2d 385 (5th Cir.), cert. 'denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1967)
(to avoid conflict with equal protection clause, classification denying benefit, causing
harm, or imposing burden must not be based on race); Moss v. Stamford Bd. of Educ.,
350 F. Supp. 879, 881-82 (D. Conn. 1972) (despite absence of explicit racial classification,
motion to dismiss equal protection claim denied where busing plan burdens minority on
account of race).
80. 430 U.S. at 165-66.
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tive white and nonwhite voting power, implied some recognition of
a group interest in voting. Although the opinion did not make clear
why the possible overrepresentation of white voters necessitated re-
jection of their equal protection claim, there are several possible ra-
tionales.
The plurality might have considered the impact of redistricting
on an overrepresented group too insignificant to constitute an injury
to voting rights.8 ' This approach departs from traditional equal pro-
tection analysis. Since voting rights are generally accorded great protec-
tion,8 2 the opinion must have been focusing not on the type of in-
terest affected, but on the degree of impact that the state's action had
on this interest. If the plurality was in fact characterizing the impact
on voting in this case as insubstantial 3 in spite of an explicit racial
classification, 84 however, it was implying that "overrepresented" groups
could explicitly and intentionally be disadvantaged because of their
race.8 5 Furthermore, the plurality's reasoning has uncertain conse-
quences. The opinion in United Jewish Organizations provides few
guidelines for limiting review of the "substantiality" of the impact
81. The plurality equated the complaint of the plaintiffs with that of any voter
whose candidate loses at the polls. Id. at 166. The opinion thus implied that despite the
presence of race-consciousness in United Jewish Organizations, the plaintiffs' claims were
no more cognizable than those of any group that failed to gain representation for any
reason whatever. Cf. Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153 (1971) (mere failure at polls
is not evidence of constitutional violation).
82. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 336 (1972) (right to equality of par-
ticipation in electoral system fundamental, constitutional right).
83. Stigmatic harm alone has been found sufficient to subject state action to strict
scrutiny. See Brest, Foreword: In Defense of the Anti-Discrimination Principle, 90 HARV.
L. REv. 1, 8-10 (1976). The closest that the Supreme Court has come to rejecting a ra-
cially based equal protection claim on the ground that the harm was minimal was in
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217 (1971), when it permitted the closing of municipal
swimming pools, despite allegations that the closings were designed to avoid integration.
Palmer and United Jewish Organizations are distinguishable, however. In Palmer the
effect was nondiscriminatory; neither whites nor blacks could use the municipal pools.
In United Jewish Organizations the ongoing state action had a deliberately dispropor-
tionate effect: nonwhite voting power was enhanced at the expense of white voting power.
84. Racial classifications traditionally create a presumption of unconstitutionality.
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 388 (1969) (singling out fair housing laws for referendum
discriminates against racial minorities); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 10 (1967) (statute
forbidding interracial marriage violates equal protection); see Dixon, The Supreme Court
and Equality: Legislative Classifications, Desegregation, and Reverse Discrimination, 62
CORNELL L. REv. 494, 503-04 (1977) (racial classification imposing detriment on affected
group upheld only once in history by Supreme Court); Emerson, Malapportionment and
Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 74 (1962) (suggesting that racially conscious redistricting
would be impermissible).
85. See Ely, The Constitutionality of Reverse Racial Discrimination, 41 U. Cm. L.
REv. 723, 727 (1974) ("[Ilt is not 'suspect' in a constitutional sense for a majority, any
majority, to discriminate against itself"). The Supreme Court has never explicitly en-
dorsed such a doctrine.
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to the context of voting rights, since the general concept of "over-
representation" might apply to other interests as well.' 6
A second possible rationale is that even if the state's action had an
adverse effect on voting rights, overrepresentation of the plaintiffs
would permit application of a lower degree of judicial scrutiny to the
redistricting.8 7 This approach also departs from the usual form of equal
protection inquiry. Under the customary two-step process, the Court
initially determines whether the state action uses a racial classification
or affects a fundamental interest and thus requires strict scrutiny.88
If strict scrutiny is appropriate, as it was in United Jewish Organiza-
tions, the Court then conventionally shifts its focus to the state in-
terest to determine if it is a compelling one justifying the apparent
discrimination. 9 In United Jewish Organizations, however, the Court
seemed to view overrepresentation of white voters as a factor that could
counteract the triggering effect of a racial classification, since it ap-
plied less than strict scrutiny to the redistricting plan from the outset.90
Finally, the plurality might have found the state's interest in the
redistricting sufficient to overcome the plaintiffs' claims regardless
of the level of scrutiny applied.0 1 Although more consistent with tra-
ditional forms of equal protection analysis, this approach has serious
problems of implementation. The opinion would permit a state to
86. Foi example, a variety of factors has led to "overrepresentation" of whites in
higher education and in employment. See, e.g., Bakke v. Regents of University of Cali-
fornia, 13 Cal. 3d 34, 59, 553 P.2d 1152, 1169, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680, 697 (1976), cert. granted,
97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977) (underrepresentation of nonwhites in medical school not sufficient
to show past discrimination); Associated Gen. Contractors of Mass., Inc. v. Altshuler,
490 F.2d 9, 18 (Ist Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 957 (1974) (continuing racial imbalance
in employment, even where history of past discrimination, only justifies remedy related
to desired end). Were the Court to adopt the insubstantial impact approach implicit
in the United Jewish Organizations opinion, whites would be unable to claim a violation
of equal protection if public schools or employers adopted quota systems, since the im-
pact on their interests as members of the overrepresented group would be deemed
insubstantial.
87. By drawing support from cases involving the right to representation for political
groups rather than racial minorities, the plurality implied that the state's action in
United Jewish Organizations should be subjected only to low level scrutiny. 430 U.S. at 167.
88. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-31 (1969) (fundamental right to travel
triggers strict scrutiny); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (racial clas-
sification in prohibition against interracial cohabitation subject to strict scrutiny); De-
velopments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076-1132 (1969) (com-
paring two tests of "restrained review" and "active review").
89. See, e.g., Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 335 (1972).
90. 430 U.S. at 167. See Note, Discriminatory Purpose Under the Equal Protection
Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights, Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 725, 755 (1977) (Court in United Jewish Organizations applied
"lower-tier scrutiny").
91. By emphasizing the importance of providing a "fair allocation of political power,"
the plurality implied that the state's interest in racial redistricting to alleviate the con-
sequences of bloc voting might be a compelling one. 430 U.S. at 167-68.
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claim a compelling interest in readjusting political power among ra-
cial groups by providing for at least temporary overrepresentation, as
through designation of "minority representatives." 92 Moreover, the
plurality did not explicitly confine its reasoning regarding propor-
tionality to the area of voting rights. The plurality's failure to provide
detailed guidelines on the general issue of reverse discrimination and
the imminence of its decision in Bakke v. Regents of the University
of California93 indicate that it did not intend in United Jewish Or-
ganizations to endorse all types of racially compensatory programs.
Yet none of the opinions provides support for singling out voting as
an interest appropriate for racial classification. Finally, the Court's
logic does not prevent extension of the state interest to enhancement
of the political power of any previously disadvantaged group, whether
defined by race or by some other criteria.94
III. United Jewish Organizations Resolved: The Source and
Justification for an Aggregate Right
The Court might have resolved the statutory and constitutional
issues more adequately in United Jewish Organizations by recognizing
an aggregate voting right for racial groups.9 5 This right would have
92. If a racial group has historically been underrepresented, a state could make an
argument that it has an interest in facilitating overrepresentation of that group for some
period of time to enable it to develop a political base and work for the passage of the
substantive legislation of which it has been deprived. Similarly, a state could argue that
it has a compelling interest in actual proportional representation of racial groups, since
such a plan would ensure that minority representatives would be able to reflect the
wishes of their constituencies in legislative assemblies. But see Chapman v. Meier, 420 U.S.
1, 17 (1975) (suggesting that claim by minorities to actual proportional representation
would be dismissed) (dictum).
93. 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098
(1977).
94. Dissenting from the court of appeals decision in the United Jewish Organizations
case, Judge Frankel noted the impossibility of districting in a manner that would provide
proportional power to all of Brooklyn's racial, ethnic, and religious groups, since the
groups may be scattered and many individuals may fall into more than one category.
United Jewish Organizations v. Wilson, 510 F.2d 512, 533-34 (2d Cir. 1974), afJ'd sub nom.
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). Cf. Kirksey v. Bd. of Super-
visors, 402 F. Supp. 658, 677 (S.D. Miss. 1975), rev'd en banc, 554 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1977)
(impossibility of confining proportional representation to racial groups). In Paige v.
Gray, 399 F. Supp. 459 (M.D. Ga. 1975), vacated and remanded, 538 F.2d 1108 (5th Cir.
1976), the court recognized the danger inherent in basing reapportionment decisions on
the Fourteenth Amendment. In order to nullify a plan that would have disadvantaged
Negro voters, the court relied exclusively on the Fifteenth Amendment and Gomillion v.
Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). See 19 HOWARD L.J. 177, 178 (1976).
95. Chief Justice Burger charged that the United Jewish Organizations plurality's
definition of racial blocs was overbroad. 430 U.S. at 185 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). What-
ever the truth of this assertion in the context of that case, it does not mean that racial
groups entitled to claim an aggregate right could not be identified. Blacks, whites,
American Indians, and Orientals are certainly racial groups within the intention of the
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provided the Court with a substantial reason for rejecting the claims
of overrepresented white voters in that case: protection of the interest
of white voters in overrepresentation would deny to nonwhites their
constitutional right not to be underrepresented. The aggregate right
would also provide the basis for defining precisely a state's authority
to alter its electoral structure, since the state would have not only a
compelling interest but also a duty to secure proportionality in poten-
tial voting power among racial groups.
A. The Constitutional Basis for an Aggregate Voting Right
The recognition of the aggregate right is a novel proposition; it
requires extension of the Fifteenth Amendment beyond original or
current understanding of its scope. But such an extension is consistent
both with the broad remedial concerns of the Amendment and with
democratic theory. The framers of the Amendment undoubtedly con-
ceived of it primarily in terms of individual rights. 96 This perception
was based at least in part on the belief that a guarantee of the indi-
vidual franchise would suffice to enable racial groups to attain the
equality they had previously been denied. 97 Nonetheless, the framers
included in the Fifteenth Amendment a proscription against "abridg-
ment" as well as "denial" of the vote. This reflects an understanding
that substantial restraints, explicit or subtle, on any racial group's
political participation were to be within the reach of the Amendment.9 s
Many current theories of participation in the political process sup-
Fifteenth Amendment. Cf. W. GILLETTE, POLITICS AND THE PASSAGE OF THE FIFTEENTH
AMENDMENT 58 (1965) (attempt to limit Amendment to "African suffrage" voted down).
In implementing the Fifteenth Amendment through the Voting Rights Act, Congress has
also accorded Hispanics the status of a racial group. See 42 U.S.C. § 1973aa-la(e) (Supp. V
1975) (identifying Spanish-speaking citizens as minority entitled to voting materials in
native language). Cf. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 767-68 (1973) (Hispanics charac-
terized as disadvantaged group entitled to Fourteenth Amendment protection against
diluting effect of multimember districts).
96. See V. GILLETTE, supra note 95, at 50 (objective of amendment simple franchise;
provisions for banning literacy tests and poll taxes and for guaranteeing right to hold
office voted down); U.S. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 2767 (1866) (Sen. Howard)
(reference to abridgment in U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 2 is "not an abridgment to a caste
or class of persons, but the abridgment or the denial applies to the persons individually").
97. J. MATHEWS, LEGISLATIVE AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF THE FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT
21-22 (1909) (wide belief that universal suffrage antidote to all political ills; task of
federal government to secure universal equality in political rights).
98. See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 345 (1960) (state may not "impair" voting
rights under guise of realigning political subdivisions); Lane v. Wilson, 307 U.S. 268, 275
(1939) ("[Fifteenth] Amendment nullifies sophisticated as well as simple-minded modes of
discrimination"). Cf. U.S. CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 353 (1886) (Rep. Rogers)
(future attempts to set differing qualifications for whites and blacks would be proscribed);
id. at 2767 (Sen. Howard) (efforts to permit blacks to vote in some but not all elections
would be violation).
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port the proposition that group access to legislative representation is
fundamental to significant political participation. 99 Group rather than
individual expression is the primary source of political influence. 100
Under a representative system, in contrast to a direct democracy, the
danger arises that selection of delegates could operate to deny some
groups the ability to combine their votes in order to exert any in-
fluence. In these circumstances it is not enough merely to ensure in-
dividual minority group members the right to cast a ballot.' 0 ' Race
remains a dominant form of social division, 0 2 and barriers erected
by representational schemes undeniably can and do interfere with
representation of racial minorities. The Court should thus recognize
that structural barriers to minority representation constitute "abridg-
ment" of the right to vote, and it should give effect to the broad pur-
poses of the Fifteenth Amendment by endorsing an aggregate voting
right.
Although the Fifteenth Amendment provides a basis for the ag-
gregate voting right, it also marks the boundaries of such an entitle-
ment. Since the aggregate right is properly confined to racial groups, 0 3
it should be enforced only where bloc voting is established by evidence
99. See, e.g., Banzhaf, supra note 17, at 1310-11 (implying that actual representation
depends on existence of ethnic blocs); Casper, supra note 15, at 32 (Court's notion of
representation "multifaceted" and includes representation of racial or ethnic interests);
Dixon, The Court, The People, and "One Man, One Vote," in REAPPORTIONMENT IN THE
1970s 7, 18-19 (N. PoIsby ed. 1971) (representation depends on relation of voter to "parti-
sans" with similar interests).
In addition, testimony at congressional hearings concerning the extension of the Voting
Rights Act indicated that Congress now recognizes the importance of proportionality.
Senator Bayh, one of the sponsors of renewal of the Act, remarked that appraisal of a
proposed change in electoral processes should involve consideration of whether such
changes afford minorities "representation roughly equivalent to their voting strength."
121 CONG. REc. S13665 (daily ed. July 24, 1975).
100. See Casper, supra note 21, at 105, 109 (mere individual vote does not entail rep-
resentation, which depends on shared interests).
101. See note 9 supra (citing authorities).
102. Statistical analyses demonstrate that voters cast their ballots along racial lines.
P. ABRAMSON, GENERATIONAL CHANGE IN AMERICAN POLITIcs 22, 71 (1975) (race is the one
enduring cleavage in American electorate, more dramatic than class differences, and
growing in importance); W. FLANIGAN & N. ZINGALE, POLITICAL BEHAVIOR OF THE AMERI-
CAN ELECTORATE 70 (3d ed. 1968) (of all socioeconomic variables, only membership in mi-
nority racial group good predictor of voting). Of course, some voters will cross racial
lines to form coalitions with respect to certain issues, but this does not vitiate the charac-
terization of race as a more important cleavage in American voting than such factors
as class identity. Indeed, the force of the racial factor is demonstrated by the frequency
with which candidates play upon racial identification to gain election. See U.S. COMM'N
ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE VOTING RIcHTs ACT: TEN YEARS AFTER 155-60 (1975) (reporting
difficulties faced by minority candidates in overcoming racial appeals) [hereinafter cited
as THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT].
103. Efforts to extend the Fifteenth Amendment to cover discrimination based on
"race, color, nativity, property, education, or religious belief" were voted down by Con-
gress. W. GILLETTE, supra note 95, at 58-62.
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that racial groups differ sharply from one another in their electoral
behavior across a wide range of issues and candidates. 04 Unless racial
groups have common interests that would otherwise be denied expres-
sion, extension of the aggregate right lacks significance. 0 1 Identifica-
tion of bloc voting and enforcement of the aggregate right is unlikely
to undercut the spirit of the Fifteenth Amendment by exacerbating
racial divisions.' 06 On the contrary, it will encourage other groups
to join minorities in coalitions10 7 and encourage candidates to appeal
to racially nondivisive issues as the political power of nonwhite groups
rises to a level commensurate with their size.' 06
B. Potential Conflicts with Precedent
This newly formulated aggregate voting right can be reconciled
with existing precedent, though it does not emerge directly from the
case law. The nonretrogression principle in Beer v. United States'0 0
104. See pp. 599-600 infra (outlining mechanics of identifying bloc voting).
105. See City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1025 (D.D.C. 1972)
(three-judge court), afI'd mem., 410 U.S. 962 (1973) ("The simple transformation of a
potential black voting majority into a clear minority has no effect on relative racial
voting strengths unless votes are cast along racial lines."). Cf. Dove v. Moore, 539 F.2d
1152, 1155-56 (8th Cir. 1976) (charge of discriminatory effect of at-large voting rejected
where "blacks and whites alike have rejected race as the overriding criterion in voting").
106. The Court should not ignore the existence of bloc voting, even if it may be an
undesirable phenomenon. In United Jewish Organizations, Justice White noted that bloc
voting by race is not rare. 430 U.S. at 166 (plurality opinion). This is consistent with
the findings of the United States Civil Rights Commission that "many white voters re-
fuse to vote for black candidates solely because of their race." THE VOTING RIGHTS Aar,
supra note 102, at 155-56. Cf. Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 144 (1976) (White, J.,
dissenting) (bloc voting "fact of life").
The increased political power of racial minorities that would flow from recognition
of the aggregate right would promote racial harmony. Politically impotent minorities
become alienated from the government and often resort to protest and violence, further
increasing their political isolation. R. DAHL, PLURALIST DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES:
CONFLicr AND CONSENT 451-52 (1967) (cycle of political alienation and violence); W.
FLANIGAN & N. ZINGALE, supra note 102, at 183-84 (blacks discouraged by failure of gov-
ernment programs losing trust in political process). Thus, actions taken to reduce po-
litical inefficacy will also reduce the chance of disruptive behavior and racial hostility.
In addition, because the individual voting right is unaffected by districting, there is no
incentive to make decisions about residential location based on legislative boundary lines.
Only persons for whom successful political participation rather than representation is
the overriding concern would base residential choice on an apportionment plan. Such
persons might include potential candidates for office and active political campaigners.
107. If minority groups develop political strength, they will attract attention from other
groups seeking to form coalitions. P. ABRAMSON, supra note 102, at 71-72 (blacks sought
out by white groups for political alliances).
108. The Civil Rights Commission has noted that enhanced minority political power
has led to a decline in racial appeals by candidates. THE VOTING RIGHTS Aar, supra note
102, at 155. But cf. The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HAv. L. REV. 135, 142 (1971)
(arguing that proportional representation is potentially inconsistent with spirit of com-
promise); Comment, supra note 27, at 400 (noncompetitive, fixed constituencies incon-
sistent with ideal political system).
109. 425 U.S. 130 (1976). In Beer the City of New Orleans reapportioned its city
council so that blacks were likely to elect at least as many councilmen as they had
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invalidates only reapportionments that reduce minority voting power
and thus, because it would protect disproportionate allocations of
power from effective challenge so long as current levels of underrepre-
sentation or overrepresentation were maintained, seems inconsistent
with proportionality of voting rights. The Court in Beer, however, ex-
plicitly linked the nonretrogression principle to statutory requirements
of the Voting Rights Act and suggested that, in this respect at least,
the Act may not extend to the limits of constitutional authority.
110
The Fifteenth Amendment, then, may require affirmative protection
of group voting rights at the same time that the Voting Rights Act
prohibits reduction of the potential representation of a group that is
underrepresented or proportionally represented."'
Whitcomb v. Chavis1 2 is a somewhat more problematic precedent
to reconcile. The Court refused to find a blanket constitutional right
to proportional representation for racial and political groups sufficient
to force replacement of multimember state legislative districts with
single-member districts."13 Although the language of this decision is
contrary to the spirit of an aggregate right, there are important dis-
tinguishing features. First, the Whitcomb case was brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment,' 14 and the Court was reluctant to embrace
the district court's proposition that groups with distinctive interests
must be represented in the legislature for fear that this principle could
not be restricted to groups defined by race."15 This apprehension is
unfounded where an aggregate voting right is derived from the Fif-
teenth Amendment. Second, the remedy of racially conscious appor-
previously, but not as many as would be proportionate to their share of the city's
population. The Court upheld this reapportionment because it did. not constitute a
retrogression of minority voting power. Id. at 141.
110. The Court in Beer defined the question as "not one of constitutional law, but
of statutory construction. A determination of when a legislative reapportionment has
'the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color,' must
depend, therefore, upon the intent of Congress in enacting the Voting Rights Act and
specifically §5." Id. at 139-40 (footnote omitted).
I11. In Beer the Court reserved the possibility that a nonretrogressive plan receiving
the Attorney General's approval might nevertheless be subject to constitutional challenge.
Id. at 142 n.14. This is consistent with an aggregate voting right if the Fifteenth Amend-
ment is viewed as creating two different rights: a right of underrepresented groups not
to experience retrogression (the right enforced through the Voting Rights Act) and the
right of all racial groups to potential proportional representation (the aggregate right).
Beer, then, would stand for the proposition that the Voting Rights Act authorizes the
Attorney General to act to enforce only the first of these rights.
112. 403 U.S. 124 (1971).
113. Id. at 149. See Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 136 n.8 (1976).
114. Chavis v. Whitcomb, 305 F. Supp. 1364, 1366-67 (S.D. Ind. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S.
124 (1971) (three-judge court) (multimember system alleged to violate equal protection
clause).
115. 403 U.S. at 156 (district court holding "not easily contained" and might be ex-
tended to "any group with distinctive interests").
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tionment and establishment of single-member districts was too drastic,
and less intrusive remedies might have been available. 1 , Finally, the
Court rejected the plaintiffs' claim apparently because it relied in part
on their actual failure to win elections 17 and would require courts
to intrude into the political process to determine if failure at the polls
could be attributed to factors other than race. Such judicial encroach-
ment would be unnecessary in proving a violation of aggregate voting
rights, since the courts would focus solely on the relationship between
the electoral process and the potential for representation of racial
groups."1
8
C. The Distinct Nature of Racial Voting Rights
The Fifteenth Amendment is concerned exclusively with racial di-
mensions of the right to vote. At the same time, certain characteristics
of voting make it a distinctive interest and justify the extension of
the aggregate right to voting in particular."19 First, recognition of such
a right can enhance important interests in representation without
jeopardizing significant individual rights of participation. 20 An in-
dividual's preferences are manifested in the government when voters
with the same interests vote together to gain representation. In order
for members of a racial group to be able to have their interests rep-
resented, then, the districting system cannot foreclose their achieving
potential proportional representation.12' Yet restructuring the politi-
cal system to conform to the racial proportionality required by the
aggregate right will not impair the opportunity of all individuals to
participate 22 at each stage of the electoral process, whether by engag-
116. See p. 598 infra (arguing that minority rights in multimember districts can be
preserved by cumulative voting).
117. 403 U.S. at 153-55.
118. See pp. 599-602 infra (describing mechanism for enforcing aggregate rights).
119. Although this Note focuses on voting rights, it may be that other interests have
characteristics that make recognition of group rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
appropriate in some contexts. See Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL.
& PUB. AFF. 107, 154-55 (1976) (general theory of group entitlements under Fourteenth
Amendment).
120. As the plurality noted in United Jewish Organizations, though the redistricting
affected the relative political power of racial groups, individuals were not "fenced out"
from political participation. 430 U.S. at 167. The single fact that individuals with dif-
fering political interests would begin to participate in districts previously dominated by
white voters did not adversely affect any voter's ability to participate. Cf. Fiss, The
Fate of An Idea Whose Time Has Come: Antidiscrimination Law in the Second Decade
after Brown v. Board of Education, 41 U. CHr. L. REv. 742, 760 n.49 (1974) (individual
voting rights not affected by participation of other voters).
121. See note I supra.
122. See note 99 supra. In contrast to an individual's interests in political participation,
his actual ability to affect an electoral outcome is insignificant. Whitcomb v. Chavis,
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ing in nominations, casting a ballot, pooling their strength by forming
coalitions, or working to influence a representative after the election.
12 3
Second, the distinct nature of voting is also evident in the con-
gruity of an aggregate right with the axioms that underlie the demo-
cratic, representative political system. Acknowledgment of an aggre-
gate right to vote is harmonious with the pluralist assumption that
voters will form groups to further collective interests.124 By contrast,
implementation of aggregate rights in school admissions or employ-
ment by the use of quota systems to reverse prior discrimination
can disadvantage individual whites who by their merits alone would
receive a place in the classroom or a job. Thus recognition of group
interests in fields other than voting might conflict with the individual
and meritocratic value assumptions that underlie our educational and
economic systems.1
25
A third special characteristic of voting is that it is an instrument
that helps minority groups to attain equal access to basic social needs
such as jobs, education, and housing. 26 Recognition of the aggregate
right maximizes the opportunity for minority self-help without in-
403 U.S. 124, 168-69 (1971) (opinion of Harlan, J.) (highly improbable that one voter
can affect outcome of election). See Rae, Reapportionment and Political Democracy, in
REAPPORTIONMIENT IN THE 1970s 91, 97 (N. Polsby ed. 1971).
123. When switched from one district to another, of course, the individual's vote may
become an insignificant part of the minority within his district, instead of an insignificant
part of the majority, but the Supreme Court has consistently held that no individual
right is violated merely because the candidates favored by the voter fail to win election.
United Jewish Organizations v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144, 166 (1977) (plurality opinion); Whit-
comb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 153-55 (1971). As long as the race-specific interests of an
individual are protected by ensuring potential proportional representation of his racial
group, his aggregate rights are preserved. Thus, ihe aggregate right does not guarantee
that an individual black in a particular district will influence the political process, but
rather that blacks as a group will share in the governmental process to the benefit of
each individually.
124. See R. DAHL, supra note 106, at 23-24 (axiom of American government that mul-
tiple groups shape policy by negotiation and compromise); Baker, Gerrymandering: Privi-
leged Sanctuary Or Next Judicial Target?, in REPRESENTATION AND MISREPRESENTATION
71, 78-79 (R. Goldwin ed. 1968) (government constituted of coalition of minority groups).
125. The adverse impact that any discriminatory device may have on the disadvan-
taged group will vary with the right at issue. For example, one commentator distinguished
between school desegregation where no one is denied an education and employment where
members of the disadvantaged group will be denied jobs. Comment, supra note 67, at 870;
cf. Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 774 (1976) ("arguably innocent" em-
ployees disadvantaged by racially conscious remedy). On the other hand, in the contro-
versial case of Bakke v. Regents of University of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d
1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 97 S. Ct. 1098 (1977), the dissent argued
that children bused to a lower quality school are not merely discommoded, but suffer
a serious loss in education. See Dixon, supra note 84, at 558 n.324.
126. The Supreme Court has characterized the right to vote as fundamental "because
preservative of all rights." Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886). See Katzenbach
v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 652 (1966) (removing obstacles to minority political participation
instrumental to nondiscriminatory allocation of public services).
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terrupting or displacing the existing mechanism for allocation of so-
cioeconomic benefits. The aggregate voting right gives disadvantaged
groups a base of strength for bargaining, a forum for voicing dissent,
and a toehold for achieving socioeconomic equality. Recognition of
the aggregate right underscores the need for participation by minority
groups so that representative bodies reflect the interests of the public
as a whole.'
127
A final concern favoring extension of racial group rights to voting
is the resistance of the political system to change from within. Legis-
lators may be expected to apportion legislative districts so as to maxi-
mize their chances for election and then to resist changing the system
that brought them to office. 128 Although periodic redistricting is now
required by the one man, one vote doctrine, the courts are loath
to interfere with apportionment plans merely because they discrimi-
nate in favor of incumbents. 12 9 When the effect of this process is to
lock minority groups out, the system cannot be purged unless courts
override the self-interest of legislators and take the countervailing fac-
tor of race into account.
IV. Implementation of the Aggregate Right to Vote
A. The Presence of "State Action"
The aggregate right may be abridged even when the state has not
acted affirmatively to change its electoral system. Governmental failure
to rectify a discriminatory system, as the Fifteenth Amendment com-
mands, becomes a constitutional violation in itself when the state has
127. "To be representative, a legislature must be an accurate map of the whole nation,
a portrait of the people, a faithful echo of their voice, a mirror which reflects accurately
the various parts of the public." Pitkin, The Concept of Representation, in REPRESENTA-
TION 1, 10 (H. Pitkin ed. 1969). When large segments of the society fail to gain repre-
sentation, the combined constituency represented by a majority of legislators may be a
minority of the total population.
128. See Baker, supra note 124, at 74-77 (legislatures loath to correct malapportion-
ment, necessitating judicial intervention). In Alabama, for example, entrenched legislators
managed to avoid reapportionment from 1901 until the Supreme Court dealt with the
problem in 1964, despite uneven growth in population leading to serious malapportion-
ment. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 539-40 (1964); see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 191
(1962) (Tennessee legislature did not reapportion itself from 1901 until 1960s). justice
Clark concluded that "the legislature had riveted the present seats in the Assembly to
their respective constituencies, and by the votes of their incumbents a reapportionment
of any kind is prevented." Id. at 259 (concurring opinion).
129. Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966) (districting to minimize contests
between present incumbents not invidious). Consideration of political factors in districting
can be used to exclude racial minorities. See Comment, supra note 27, at 405 (gerry-
mandered districts may minimize need to include small interest groups in electoral
coalitions).
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monopoly power over creation and maintenance of that system. 130 The
state is necessarily responsible for apportionment in the first instance,
and by holding elections the state implicitly endorses the existing elec-
toral scheme. As under the one man, one vote standard,' 3 1 then, the
courts in enforcing the aggregate right should focus not on the origin
of any apportionment, but on its impact on voters.
A corollary to such automatic enforcement of the aggregate right
is the irrelevance of any proof of intent to discriminate. 32 Although
United Jewish Organizations and Justice Stewart's opinion in particular
refer to intent, 33 discussion of this concept was directed primarily
130. See Pollak, Racial Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor
Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 22-23 (1959) (Fifteenth Amendment imposes affirmative
duty to assure equal franchise); cf. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964) (main-
taining districts of unequal size equivalent to enacting law permitting some voters to cast
several ballots); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678, 691 (1964) (malapportionment resulting from
"prolonged legislative inaction" violates equal protection).
The nonretrogression principle endorsed in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130 (1976),
seems to indicate that in some instances affirmative state action is required before a
violation of voting rights can be found. In Beer, however, the court was exclusively
concerned with statutory interpretation and did not imply that a state must act affirma-
tively to change. electoral rules before a constitutional claim will be sustained. See p.
591 and notes 110-11 supra. Indeed, the statutory nonretrogression principle illustrates
the difficulties inherent in attempting to apply a requirement of state action in the
context of rights like voting that depend on a political structure created by the state
in the first instance. Suppose, for example, that population shifts lead to a drastic un-
derrepresentation of minority voters when the state has reauthorized but not altered
boundaries. The Court could use as its basis for measuring "retrogression" either (1)
the proportional voting power of minorities at the time of the original apportionment,
in which case reenactment of the same district boundaries after population shifts would
constitute retrogression, or (2) the actual physical lines of original apportionment, in
which case reenactment without change would always be permissible. Thus the statutory
requirement of recent state action altering the electoral system causes uncertainty that
can be avoided by proceeding under a constitutional analysis that emphasizes the result
rather than the means.
Scholars have often chafed at the distinction between affirmative action and nonaction
by the state. See, e.g., Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CHI. L. RFv. 235,
313 (1971). Indeed, the Court has sometimes indicated that permitting certain acts con-
stitutes endorsement by the state and is subject to judicial scrutiny. Evans v. Newton,
382 U.S. 296, 299 (1966) (previously public park could not be maintained privately on segre-
gated basis). This view is particularly appropriate in the context of political organization
over which the state has a monopoly. See R. DIxoN, supra note 18, at 13.
131. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964) (maintaining districts of
unequal size equivalent to enacting law perpetuating disparity in voting rights).
132. In the one man, one vote cases, there is no requirement of proof that the state
"intended" to discriminate against individuals in overpopulated districts. See Reynolds
v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562-63 (1964) (dealing exclusively with discriminatory effects of
malapportionment).
133. 430 U.S. at 165 (plurality opinion); id. at 180 (Stewart, J., concurring). Professor
Brest seems to agree with Justice Stewart that the state displayed no invidious intent in
United Jewish Organizations.
The mere fact that a political gerrymander designed to aid blacks diminishes the
voting power of a neighboring Jewish community does not trigger the antidiscrimi-
nation principle. But if the circumstances suggest that the decision was motivated
595
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to the plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims.13 4 Cases decided un-
der the Voting Rights Act have always implicitly recognized that proof
of intent is unnecessary to find a violation of the Fifteenth Amend-
-ment,135 and the Voting Rights Act itself proscribes changes in the
electoral process that have either the "purpose or effect" of abridging
the right to vote. 3 6 The actual purpose of the legislature should be
unimportant where citizens have a right to a system of governance with
by anti-Semitic prejudice, it should be treated like any other nonbenign race-de-
pendent decision.
Brest, supra note 83, at 17 (footnote omitted).
But the requirement of invidious intent has primarily been applied where state action
is facially neutral but has a disproportionate racial effect. Compare McLaughlin v.
Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 191-92 (1964) (explicit prohibition of interracial cohabitation invalid
despite application to whites and blacks alike) with Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
242 (1976) (disproportionate effect alone does not offend Constitution). In contrast,
United Jewish Organizations involved state action that explicitly considered racial criteria
precisely in order to effect a disproportionate result. See Brest, Palmer v. Thompson: An
Approach to the Problem of Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95, 108
(racial criterion in statute triggers requirement for extraordinary justification even without
finding of illicit motive); Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitu-
tional Law, 79 YALE L.J. 1205, 1281 (1970) (motivation relevant only where government
not already obligated by use of racial criterion to justify action).
134. Justice Stewart's intent argument relies on equal protection cases such as Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (disproportionate impact of recruiting procedures
challenged under equal protection component of Fifth Amendment due process clause),
and Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (zoning
policies challenged under equal protection clause). 430 U.S. at 179. Because the equal
protection clause applies to state action of any type, a test of disproportionate effect
alone would result in nullification of virtually all legislation. Some limitations must be
imposed, and the Court has chosen to focus on intent. In contrast, the Fifteenth Amend-
ment is limited by its terms to voting rights.
135. See, e.g., Howard v. Adams County Bd. of Supervisors, 453 F.2d 455, 457-58
(5th Cir. 1972) (proof of intent alternative to proof of effect in showing constitutional
violation); City of Petersburg v. United States, 354 F. Supp. 1021, 1024, 1031 (D.D.C. 1972)
(three-judge court), aff'd mer., 410 U.S. 962 (1973) (plan unconstitutional even though
"nothing in the annexation . . . indicated that it had a racial purpose"). Though the
Supreme Court has referred to intent in Fifteenth Amendment cases, see Wright v.
Rockefeller, 376 U.S. 52, 56 (1964); Comillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960) (re-
drawing of boundary lines alleged to be "device to disenfranchise Negro citizens," "solely
concerned" with segregation), it did not hold intent to be a necessary element of a con-
stitutional violation, and these cases are therefore not contrary to the principle suggested
here. The Court in Gomillion alluded to the "inevitable effect" of the gerrymandering.
364 U.S. at 342. It also observed that the effect of the gerrymandering of Tuskegee
was so blatantly discriminatory that an invidious intent could be inferred, 364 U.S. at
346-47, and this can be read merely as emphasis of the magnitude of the effect rather
than as a finding of an additional necessary element. In Wright the Court noted that
the evidence did not prove that the apportionment was racially motivated. 376 U.S.
at 56. Thus the Court found merely that discriminatory intent, which might have been
sufficient in itself, was not proved. It did not reach the question of whether the effect
of the plan was to abridge minority voting rights, since the plaintiffs framed their
complaint in terms of segregation rather than underrepresentation. Id. at 53-54.
136. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a), 1973c (Supp. V 1975). Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 149
n.5 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (showing of purpose or effect alone sufficient to demon-
strate unconstitutionality); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U.S. 433, 439 (1965) (change in election
laws that abridges right to vote, "whether designedly or otherwise," may be invalid).
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certain objectively defined characteristics such as population equality
among districts or proportional voting power among races. 137
B. Application of the Aggregate Right to
Different Electoral Systems
The aggregate right should apply to the electoral systems of federal,
state, and local governments alike. 38 At each of these levels represen-
tational schemes fall into two general categories: those employing
only single-member districts and those using multimember districts
with at-large voting. Aggregate voting rights have different implica-
tions for each system.
For a single-member electoral system, an approximation of racial
proportionality requires the type of race-conscious redistricting that
New York attempted in United Jewish Organizations. But this type
of districting can only assure proportionality where racial groups are
geographically concentrated. A tension thus might arise between the
goal of absolute proportionality and the state's interests in designing
compact and contiguous districts and in preserving existing political
subdivision boundaries. As in the one man, one vote cases, the Court
should take a flexible approach and preserve the state interests wher-
ever possible. Use of compact, contiguous districts increases the like-
lihood that voters will share common interests and engage in personal
interchange during election campaigns, and it protects against gerry-
mandering. 3 9 Similarly, adherence to the boundaries of local govern-
137. Cf. Note, Wright v. Rockefeller and Legislative Gerrymanders: Decision Plus a
Problem of Proof, 72 YALE L.J. 1041, 1059-60 (1963) (state should carry burden of showing
permissible basis for gerrymander after plaintiff has refuted commonly known, non-
racial motivations); Note, supra note 2, at 998 (design of electoral scheme without in-
vidious intent can nevertheless result in unequal treatment of voters). As the Supreme
Court has noted, a "politically mindless approach may produce, whether intended or
not, the most grossly gerrymandered results." Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753
(1973). Indeed, discriminatory effect can prove conclusive by raising a presumption of
unconstitutionality, even in areas other than voting. See Alexander v. Louisiana, 405 U.S.
625, 632 (1972) ("good faith" selection of jurors nevertheless resulted in discrimination);
Eubanks v. Louisiana, 356 U.S. 584, 587-88 (1958) (selection of "best qualified" jurors
resulted in exclusion of blacks). See generally Fiss, supra note 130, at 291 (in voting,
use of facially innocent criteria not immune to challenge if disproportionate effect); Note,
Reading the Mind of the School Board: Segregative Intent and the De Facto/De Jure
Distinction, 86 YALE L.J. 317, 355 (1976) (Court has failed to specify who must exhibit
discriminatory purpose, what it consists of, and how to prove it).
138. It is clear that the Fifteenth Amendment applies to state and local as well as
federal elections. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341-42 (1960) (racial
gerrymandering of municipality invalid under Fifteenth Amendment); Smith v. Allwright,
321 U.S. 649, 663-64, 666 (1944) (Fifteenth Amendment forbids statewide white primary).
139. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578-79 (1964) (state interest in preserving
political subdivision boundaries and creating compact and contiguous districts justifies
some deviation from absolute population equality between districts); Bickel, The Dura-
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mental entities enhances the ability of each legislator to represent a
constituency with common concerns.
140
At-large voting presents a different problem. Minorities are sub-
merged not by boundary drawing, but by the choice of electoral
mechanisms. Where voters are both required to cast as many votes
as there are positions to be filled and forbidden from casting more
than one vote for any single candidate, a minority can effectively
be denied representation.' 4 1 A jurisdiction using at-large voting should
thus be limited to cumulative voting, which allows individuals to cast
all of their votes for a single candidate. 42 With cumulative voting, a
cohesive minority by selective voting can elect a number of represen-
tatives approximately proportional to the group's size.' 43
Where a minority group is geographically scattered, an at-large sys-
tem that permits cumulative voting would ensure the potential for
proportional representation whereas a system of geographic districts
would not. 44 Nevertheless, the Fifteenth Amendment should not be
bility of Colegrove v. Green, 72 YALE L.J. 39, 40 (1962) (representative system "stable
and effective" when "interests, groups, and regions" as well as individuals considered
in political structure).
140. See Mahan v. Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 325 (1973). The common concerns that bind
a political subdivision supplement those normally associated with racial, economic, or
political groups. For example, a congressman who represents a single city can devote
his full attention to "pork barrel" legislation that will benefit his constituency. If a
congressman represents parts of two adjacent cities, many of his efforts may benefit one
but not the other of these subdivisions.
141. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70 (1973); see Carpenti, Legislative Apportion-
ment: Multimember Districts and Fair Representation, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 666 (1972);
Comment, Effective Representation and Multimember Districts, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1577,
1586-87 (1970) (interest group must be larger in multimember district than in single-
member district in order to gain representation).
142. See generally E. LAKEMAN, How DEMOCRACIES VOTE 85-88 (3d ed. 1970) (defi-
nition and discussion of cumulative voting).
143. In order for cumulative voting to secure precise proportionality, interest group
leaders must accurately estimate the size of the group and issue explicit directions on
voting. E. LAKEMAN, supra note 142, at 87. Even with cumulative voting, a system that
combines districting with the election of some representatives at large can frustrate the
goal of proportional representation. As long as the numbers of at-large seats is kept small
enough, even cumulative voting will not ensure that minorities will be represented among
these delegates. Therefore, a mixed system should be treated like geographic apportion-
ment with racial minorities entitled to potential representation that would take all
seats into consideration.
The problem posed by mixed plans was illustrated in Beer v. United States, 425 U.S.
130 (1976). In that case, although the New Orleans districts were so apportioned that
they would meet a proportionality test, id. at 136-37 n.8, 141-42, the existence of at-large
seats that blacks could not win served to dilute minority strength.
144. At-large voting at least avoids the possibility that a minority of voters will ef-
fectively control the legislature, a result possible under a geographic representational
system. See E. LAKEMAN, supra note 142, at 73-76 (describing instances of minority con-
trol in systems of geographical representation). To illustrate the dangers of a district
system, consider a configuration of nine voters, five blacks and four whites, assigned
to three districts. Although the blacks have a majority of voters, they can be outvoted
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construed to dictate the state's initial choice between district and at-
large representational systems. 145 Neither the language nor the history
of that Amendment justifies uprooting every system of geographical
districting, and the aggregate right should be construed to require
simply the minimization of bias within the existing structure. 46 As in
the one man, one vote context, values of federalism argue in favor
of allowing the states to retain certain traditional prerogatives in the
design of their electoral processes.'
47
C. Mechanics of Enforcement
The aggregate voting right proposed here can be enforced by the
judiciary. A court initially must determine if the precondition of
bloc voting is present.' 48 Defining the degree of cohesiveness in vot-
ing behavior that constitutes bloc voting is necessarily arbitrary, and
for this reason it would be appropriate for Congress to create rules
for identifying a racial bloc. Nevertheless, since the aggregate right is
a constitutional entitlement, the courts may act independently to en-
in the legislature if the whites are divided between two districts and constitute the ma-
jority in each. Were the same nine voters to elect three representatives at-large with a
mechanism for cumulative voting, the blacks could win two of the three seats.
145. Although "[1]imitless extension of the [one person, one vote] principle might re-
quire that states hold all legislative and congressional elections at large," such a wholesale
revision of the political system has never been mandated. Wilkinson, The Supreme Court,
The Equal Protection Clause, and the Three Faces of Constitutional Equality, 61 VA. L.
REV. 945, 972 (1975). The Court has demonstrated a preference for single-member districts.
Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690, 692 (1970) (per curiam) (single-member districts pre-
ferred when remedy imposed by court).
146. Geographical representation has certain structural advantages that led to its
adoption originally and now argue for its maintenance, even where it does not permit
full proportional representation. It provides stability by ensuring that no region of the
country goes without representation, and it aids the achievement of a popular consensus
by forcing disparate groups within an area to form coalitions in order to gain repre-
sentation. Dixon, The Warren Court Crusade for the Holy Grail of "One Aan-One Vote,"
1969 Sup. CT. REV. 219, 254-55.
147. See pp. 600-01 infra (values of compactness and contiguity may justify deviations
from perfect districting). The Tenth Amendment reserves to the states the powers not
delegated to the federal government. U.S. CONsT. amend. X. Since the aggregate right is
derived from the Fifteenth Amendment, however, its enforcement does not encroach upon
state prerogatives. The question thus becomes one of determining which state powers the
Fifteenth Amendment withdrew from the states. There is no evidence that the Amend-
ment contemplated total redesign of the traditional geographic basis for representation.
See Casper, supra note 21, at 103-04.
148. For example, a court might conclude that bloc voting is present within a
municipality when 95% of all black voters voted together in nine of the last ten elec-
tions, while only 10% of the white voters ever supported candidates favored by the
black voters. Although voting statistics for statewide elections might be considered in
determining local bloc voting, they should not be accorded as much weight as elections
for local office where racial divisions in the slating of candidates would also be reflected.
Only where bloc voting occurs over an extended period of time should it lead to an
inference of racial cleavages in the electorate justifying recognition of an aggregate right.
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force it in the absence of legislatively designed rules, as they did in
implementing the one man, one vote principle.
149
Bloc voting in one city would not, of course, require redistricting
to ensure proportional representation for all election contests held
within an entire state. Thus, in United Jewish Organizations, if ra-
cial groups in Brooklyn voted by bloc, but those elsewhere in the
state did not, the state would be obligated to engage in racially con-
scious redistricting only in Brooklyn, and would not be required to
reapportion other legislative districts. An objective test for bloc voting
would be more manageable than tests used in voting cases such as
White v. Regester, where the Court made subjective judgments about
the adequacy of actual representation. 50
Once bloc voting has been identified, a court must determine the
extent to which the existing political structure deviates from one
that would guarantee potential proportional representation. In a city
with a concentrated minority population of twenty percent and a five-
person city council, for example, apportionment would be inadequate
unless one council district had a nonwhite majority. To determine
the proportion of minority persons in the electorate and in each dis-
trict, the court would look to eligible voting age population. The
number and distribution of eligible voters do not change as precipi-
tously as do voter registration figures; 1 1 statistics using the eligible
voting population are considered relevant under the Voting Rights
Act; 152 and they lead to the most equitable results.
5 3
If deviations from proportionality are found, the courts must then
149. In the one man, one vote cases, the Court developed its own standards to enforce
a constitutional right in the absence of congressional initiative. See, e.g., Gaffney v.
Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 751 (1973) (deviation between district populations of eight
percent acceptable); Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 442-45 (1967) (deviation from 18.28%
overrepresented to 15.27% underrepresented invalid).
150. In White v. Regester, the Court referred both to the failure of nonwhites to
win political office in the past and to the good faith concern for the interests of minority
voters shown by white legislators. 412 U.S. 755, 766-67 (1973). A court utilizing such a good
faith test would necessarily examine legislative acts themselves. In fact, courts dealing with
this problem seem to have escaped such inquiry because the appropriate proof has
not been offered. See, e.g., Wallace v. House, 515 F.2d 619, 639 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated,
425 U.S. 947 (1976); Van Cleave v. Town of Gibsland, 380 F. Supp. 135 (W.D. La. 1974).
151. This can be contrasted to the number of voters actually registered. "[Flluctua-
tions in the number of registered voters in a given election may be sudden and sub-
stantial, caused by such fortuitous factors as a peculiarly controversial election issue,
a particularly popular candidate, or even weather conditions." Burns v. Richardson, 384
U.S. 73, 93 (1966) (quoting Ellis v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 352 F.2d 123,
130 (4th Cir. 1965)).
152. See 28 C.F.R. § 51.10(b)(6) (1977) (issued pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1973c (Supp. V
1975)).
153. Considering only the number of registered voters would cause underrepresentation
of groups that have traditionally been discriminated against in the political process and
would perpetuate malapportionment. See Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 92-93 (1966).
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determine if they can be remedied1 4 Because the ability to achieve
precise proportionality depends on the distribution of minority group
members throughout the population, a uniform level of tolerance for
deviation cannot be established.155 Deviation from absolute propor-
tionality by even a single district may be unacceptable where non-
whites are residentially concentrated, but such deviations may be in-
evitable where minority voters are dispersed. Enforcement should
involve selection of the plan consistent with compact districting that
comes closest to ensuring proportionality.156
Enforcement of an aggregate voting right in this manner will not
unduly tax existing administrative capabilities or restrict flexibility
of state decisions. Only a single factor is added to the constraints al-
ready placed on the states by the one man, one vote principle, and
a vast number of possible patterns of districting remain.157
154. In some cases, it may be easier to achieve proportionality if the requirement
of population equality between districts is relaxed, but the individual right to vote
protected by the one man, one vote standard is necessary to make the aggregate right
meaningful and should remain legally dominant. In practice, the significance of any
resulting limitations on the aggregate right to vote will be diminished by the residual
flexibility in districting. See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526, 534-35 n.6 (1973)
(little conflict between demands of one man, one vote doctrine and those of Voting
Rights Act has been experienced).
155. "Tolerance" levels must vary not only with the residential concentration of
minorities, but also with the number of representatives elected to the legislative body.
A tolerance level of 10%, for example, would permit even a wholly concentrated black
population constituting 20% of the total electorate to be excluded from representation
in a three-member city council. If the legislative body had 100 members, on the other
hand, there would ideally be a black majority in 20% of the districts, but a 10% margin
would permit blacks to have potential majorities in as few as 18 districts and as many
as 22.
156. There is a temporal as well as a geographical dimension to districting. A state
could contend, for example, that its plan is designed to reflect not the current racial
proportions of its population, but the anticipated racial composition some years hence.
Because of the potential abuse inherent in such future-oriented plans, courts should
subject them to the strictest scrutiny. See Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 535 (1969)
(adjustments for future population trends must be based on full documentation and be
applied systematically).
157. The state has extensive leeway in districting as long as proportionality is main-
tained. Thus, once a particular district has been designated to have a white majority,
the state may make the majority anything greater than 50% of the eligible voting
population. The courts would thus be relieved from the responsibility of determining
what constitutes an "effective majority." Cf. Note, Compensatory Racial Reapportionment,
25 STAN. L. Rxv. 84 (1972) (suggesting tolerances for concentration of minorities in legis-
lative districts).
Even when complying strictly with the requirements of the aggregate right to vote
and the one man, one vote principle, states would retain a surprising number of alterna-
tives in designing apportionment plans. For example, in a city with three districts, four
black voters and eight white voters, one black majority district would be required.
Theoretically, there are 2,310 ways of insuring that one district has either three or four
black voters. Of course, the actual number of possibilities will be reduced by considerations
of compactness, but it will increase again as more voters are included in a more realistic
model.
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As a constitutional standard derived from the Fifteenth Amend-
ment, the aggregate right to vote should be enforceable independently
of the Voting Rights Act.15s A private right of action should be per-
mitted for abridgment of the aggregate right to vote similar to the
right of action allowed for many other violations of constitutional
rights.159 Plaintiffs should carry the burden of proving bloc voting,
showing that the existing system fosters underrepresentation, and sug-
gesting alternative plans. The defendant governmental units could
then raise any affirmative defense challenging the proposed plans for
failure to consider factors such as compactness, and they might also
present alternative plans.' 60
Conclusion
Without recognition of an aggregate right to vote, racial minorities
may continue to suffer denial of significant representation in the sys-
tem of legislative governance. Although in United Jewish Organiza-
tions v. Carey the Supreme Court neglected the occasion to recognize
such a right, it should take full advantage of the next such oppor-
tunity to extend the Fifteenth Amendment protections afforded to
racial groups. Enforcement of the aggregate right can help prevent
the promise of racial equality from being an empty one.
158. Such a right would not wholly supplant the need for the Voting Rights Act,
however, and indeed it would be wise for Congress to extend the Act to provide for
enforcement of the aggregate right by the Justice Department. The review of electoral
changes would still be important to prevent states from introducing devices that would
abridge either the individual or the aggregate voting right. The disadvantages of case-
by-case litigation would remain even after acknowledgment of an aggregate voting right.
159. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)
(search in violation of Fourth Amendment gives injured party cause of action); Douglas
v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 162 (1943) (deprivation of free speech sufficient to
create cause of action). Indeed, the federal statute providing jurisdiction for deprivation
of civil rights specifically recognizes a cause of action for violations of the right to vote.
28 U.S.C. § 1343(4) (1970).
160. This allocation of burden would rectify an existing assymetry between Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendment cases. "While states must carry the burden of justifying any
population variances in their plans, the burden of proof in racial gerrymander cases
has to date rested with the plaintiffs." Note, supra note 9, at 596.
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